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Abstract
We present a methodology and an example of preparing an order of merit list to rank terrorist targets based upon
decision-maker weights. We used an old terrorist data set as our base data to keep the information unclassified. This
data is used to demonstrate this methodology. We perform numerical iterative criteria weight sensitivity analysis to
show the effects on the model’s outputs in changes in the weights. We identify the critical criterion.
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1. Introduction
The United States of America is still fighting the global
war against terrorism. This strategy is imbedded in many
of our countries’ strategic plans. The National Strategy for
Combating Terror1 states that the United States
Government’s intent is ‘‘victory in the long war against
terror’’, and that the goal and objective is ‘‘to defeat ter-
rorists and their organizations’’. The US has coined this
struggle as the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the tar-
geting of a terrorist organizations’ personnel is an integral
part of this effort.
According to Department of Defense (DOD) doctrine in
Army FM 34-8-22 and FM 3-60:3
Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the
appropriate response to them, including operational require-
ments and capabilities. The purpose of targeting is to disrupt,
delay, or limit threat interference with friendly Courses of
Action (COAs).2
Human-targeting, the process of selecting a human tar-
get, exists as a subset of this more general targeting doc-
trine. This human targeting is being applied to terrorists.
A common misconception is that human-targeting
denotes either a hard-power and soft-power strategy that
involves either kinetic or non-kinetic power. Human-tar-
geting is instead intent or objective neutral: it does not
specify the type of action taken nor the counterterrorism
(CT) objective desired. Human-targeting, rather, repre-
sents an analytical process that assigns a heuristic value to
a target. This assignment of ‘‘value’’ allows for the priori-
tization of multiple targets and this prioritization permits
CT organizations to direct efforts and allocate resources.
Consequently, every government agency, unit, or official
whose function serves to counter terrorism remains depen-
dent on the human-targeting process. In order to mitigate
this risk, we propose the development of a systematic
method for the conduct of human targeting. We test the
proposition that statistical and mathematical modeling
methods extensively tested and used in other academic
and commercial disciplines may be successfully applied to
prioritize human targeting. This paper is an example of
this concept.
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The process involves numerous complex and dynamic
interactions filled with ambiguities. Minor variations in
the process dramatically affect human-targeting decisions
producing essentially unpredictable results. The fog of war
causes varied decisions. In other words, CT organizations
may be targeting the wrong (or a less-valuable) terrorist.
This inefficiency is not only a misuse of intelligence, but
wastes limited national resources, which inevitably place
lives unnecessarily at risk. Left unaddressed, this critical
United States Government decision-making process with
systemic problems could result in a catastrophic intelli-
gence failure.
In previous work by Twedell and Edmonds4 a series of
six linear regression models were used to ultimately model
and obtain a series of terrorist rank orderings. We believe
our proposed methodology is better suited to obtain a rank
ordering. In addition, in previous research using AHP and
the Technique of Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal
Solution (TOPSIS) alone we found a need for decision-
maker weights. Without the actual analysts and decision
makers to provide weights, we used a hybrid approach
where we used AHP’s subjective methods to obtain
weights from our prioritized criteria and then available
unclassified data for the terrorist themselves and their
organizations.
2. Proposed methodology: TOPSIS
TOPSIS was the result of work done by Yoon and
Hwang.5 TOPSIS has been used in a wide spectrum of
comparisons of alternatives including: item selection from
among alternatives, ranking leaders or entities, remote sen-
sing in regions, data mining, and supply chain operations.
TOPSIS is chosen over other methods because it orders
the feasible alternatives according to their closeness to an
ideal solution.6
Napier7 provided some analysis of the use of TOPSIS
for the DOD in industrial base planning and item selection.
For years the military used TOPSIS to rank order the sys-
tems’ request from all of the branches within the service
for the annual budget review process8 as well as being
taught again in as part of decision analysis. Current work
is being done to show the ability of TOPSIS to rank order
nodes of a dark or social network across all the metrics of
social network analysis.9,10
In manufacturing analysis, Wang and He11 proposed
two methods to improve TOPSIS for multi-response opti-
mization using Taguchi’s loss function. Ozturk and
Batuk12 used TOPSIS for spatial decisions and then linked
to geographical information systems (GIS) operations for
flood vulnerability. Olson and Wu13 have shown how
TOPSIS may be used for data mining and analysis in
credit card score data. Olson and Wu13 presented a com-
parison of weights (centroid weights, equal weights, and
weights by linear regression) in TOPSIS models using
baseball data where their conclusion is that accurate
weights in TOPSIS are crucial to success.
In a business setting it has been applied to a large num-
ber of application cases in advanced manufacturing pro-
cesses,14–16 purchasing and outsourcing,17,18 and financial
performance measurement.19
In social and dark networks, TOPSIS has been used to
rank order the nodes across all metrics in order to identify
the most influential node.13,20
TOPSIS methodology
The TOPSIS process is carried out as follows:
Step 1
Create an evaluation matrix consisting of m alterna-
tives (Ai) and n criteria, with the intersection of each
alternative and criteria given as xij, giving us a matrix
(Xij)mxn:









x11 x12 x13 : : : x1n
x21 x22 x23 : : : x2n
x31 x32 x33 : : : x3n
: : : :
: : : :
: : : :






The matrix shown as D above then normalized to
form the matrix R=(Rij)mxn,




for i=1,2.,m; j = 1,2,.n
Step 3
Calculate the weighted normalized decision matrix.
First we need the weights. Weights
can come from either the decision maker or by
computation.
Step 3(a).
Use either the decision maker’s weights for the attri-
butes x1,x2,..xn or compute the weights through the use
of Saaty’s21–23 AHP decision maker weights method to
obtain the weights (wj) as the eigenvector to the
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The sum of the weights over all attributes must equal 1
regardless of the method used.
Step 3(b).
Multiply the weights to each of the column entries in
the matrix from Step 2 to obtain the normalized deci-
sion matrix, T:
T = (tij)mx n= (wjrij)mx n, i= 1, 2, . . . ,m
Step 4
Determine the worst alternative (Aw) and the best alter-
native (Ab): examine each attribute’s column and select
the largest and smallest values appropriately. If the val-
ues imply larger is better (profit), then the best alterna-
tives are the largest values, and if the values imply
smaller is better (such as cost), then the best alternative
is the smallest value:
Aw= fmax (tijji= 1, 2, . . . ,mjj∈ J, min (tijji= 1, 2, . . . ,m)
jj∈ J+ g≡ ftwjjj= 1, 2, . . . , ng
Ab= fmin (tijji= 1, 2, . . .,mjj∈ J, max (tijji= 1, 2, . . . ,m)
jj∈ J+ g≡ ftbjjj= 1, 2, . . . , ng
here Jþ= fj= 1, 2, . . . njj) associated with the criteria
having a positive impact, and J= fj= 1, 2, . . . njj)
associated with the criteria having a negative impact.
We suggest that if possible make all entry values in
terms of positive impacts.
Step 5
Calculate the L2-distance between the target alternative
i and the worst condition Aw
diw=
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiXn
j= 1 (tij  twj)
2,
r
i= 1, 2, . . .m




j= 1 (tij  tbj)
2
r
, i= 1, 2, . . .m
where diw and dib are L2-norm distances from the target
alternative i to the worst and best conditions,
respectively.
Step 6
Calculate the similarity to the worst condition:
siw= diw
(diw+ dib) , 0≤ siw≤ 1, i= 1, 2, . . . ,m
siw = 1 if and only if the alternative solution has the
worst condition, and siw = 0 if and only if the alterna-
tive solution has the best condition.
Step 7
Rank the alternatives according to their value from Siw
(i = 1,2,.,m).
Normalization
Two methods of normalization that have been used to deal
with incongruous criteria dimensions are linear normaliza-
tion and vector normalization.
Linear normalization can be calculated as in Step 2 of
the TOPSIS process above. Vector normalization was
incorporated with the original development of the TOPSIS




for i=1,2.,m; j = 1,2,.n.
In using vector normalization, the nonlinear distances
between single dimension scores and ratios should produce
smoother trade-offs.25
Sensitivity analysis
Since AHP, at least in the pairwise comparisons, is based
upon subjective inputs using the nine-point scale then sen-
sitivity analysis is extremely important. Leonelli26 in his
master’s thesis, outlines procedures for sensitivity analysis
to enhance decision support tools, including numerical
incremental analysis of a weight, probabilistic simulations,
and mathematical models. How often do we change our
minds about the relative importance of an object, place, or
thing? Often enough that we should alter the pairwise com-
parison values to determine how robust our rankings are in
the AHP process. We suggest doing enough sensitivity
analysis to find the ‘‘break-point’’ values, if they exist, of
the decision-maker weights that change the rankings of our
alternatives. Since the pairwise comparisons are subjective
matrices compiled using Saaty’s method, we suggest as a
minimum a ‘‘trial and error’’ sensitivity analysis using the
numerical incremental analysis of the weights.
Hwang et al.25 grouped sensitivity analysis into three
main groups: numerical incremental analysis, probabilistic
simulations, and mathematical models The numerical
incremental analysis, also known as one-at-a-time (OAT)
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or ‘‘trial and error’’ works by incrementally changing one
parameter at a time, finding the new solution and showing
graphically how the ranks change. There exist several var-
iations of this method.27,28 Probabilistic simulation
employs Monte Carlo simulation29 that allows random
changes in the weights and simultaneously explores the
effect on the ranks. Modeling may be used when it is pos-
sible to express the relationship between the input data
and the solution results.
The decision weights are subject to sensitivity analysis
to determine how they affect the final ranking. The same
procedures discussed previously are valid here. Sensitivity
analysis is essential to good analysis. In addition,
Alinezhad and Amini30 suggest sensitivity analysis for
TOPSIS for changing an attribute weight. The equation
they developed for adjusting weights based upon a single






where w’j is the future weight of criteria j, wp the current
selected weight to be changed, w’p the new value of the
selected weight, wj is the current weight of criteria j.
In this paper, we demonstrate the hybrid AHP–TOPSIS
methodology by using AHP to obtain the critical decision-
maker weights and then applying it to the terrorist-ranking
problem identified by Twedell and Edmonds.4 We must
caveat, that the model constructed and presented in this
research is based entirely on our personal analysis and sub-
jective judgments of the discrete data set found in Twedell
and Edmonds’ thesis.4 A real-world application of this
methodology for ranking terrorists would require the expli-
cit input and pairwise preferences of the commensurate
decision -makers within the US Government.
We devised a three-phase methodology for analyzing
terrorists as outlined in Figure 1.
3. Applying the phases
Before applying our methodology, we first conducted a
comprehensive review of Twedell and Edmonds’ research
and a detailed analysis of their data set. The first compo-
nent of their data set consists of two target lists, the Green
Target List and the Blue Target List that are based on
actual historical target lists that were created by an
unknown CT analyst sometime between 2004 and 2005
(Tables 1 and 2).
To construct these target lists, Twedell and Edmonds4
thoroughly researched both of the analyst-created target
lists and eliminated terrorists from their consideration if
they could not corroborate identities or find corresponding
data for the attributes they were analyzing (note that the
terrorist identities were masked by Twedell and Edmonds4
using a generic Terrorist ID number). Since this elimina-
tion process left gaps in the rankings from the analysts’
lists, for the purpose of our research we re-ranked the
remaining terrorists in each list (depicted in the Ordinal
rank row in Tables 1 and 2). The 21 terrorists on the Green
Target List and the 45 terrorists on the Blue Target List
will be evaluated as our alternatives by our model.
Terrorist attributes
The second component of the data set contains a list of 74
critical terrorist attributes that Twedell and Edmonds4
hypothesized that CT analysts explicitly and/or implicitly
considered when constructing target lists.31–33 These attri-
butes were further classified into five categories: (1) orga-
nizational variables, (2) individual variables, specific cell
Figure 1. Human-targeting methodology using hybrid AHP–TOPSIS methods.
4 Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology
membership/individual experience, (3) other individual
variables, (4) individual variables, ‘‘Worldliness’’, and (5)
social network analysis/graph theory measure variables.
Figure 2 shows all 74 terrorist attributes and their category
classification.
Using open source information, historical classified doc-
uments, and the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment
(TIDE) database (the US central repository of information
on international terrorist identities) Twedell and Edmonds
aggregated data values for as many attributes as they could
for the terrorists on the Green and Blue Target Lists.
Phase one: apply AHP to criteria weights (attributes)
According to Joint Publication 3-60:34
Every target has distinct intrinsic or acquired characteristics,
the most important of which affect how it is targeted. These
characteristics form the basis for target detection, location,
identification, and classification for future surveillance, anal-
ysis, strike, and assessment.
Joint Publication (JP) 3–6034
Step one: build a decision hierarchy of the problem. As stated
in our methodology section, this phase uses an abbreviated
version of AHP to calculate only the global decision
weights of our decision criteria. In AHP the first task is to
disaggregate a problem into a decision hierarchy consist-
ing of a goal, a list of alternatives, and a set of decision
criteria. In our problem, our stated goal is to construct a
prioritized target list using the terrorists identified on the
Green and Blue Target Lists (Tables 1 and 1) as our deci-
sion alternatives. Our analysis reduced these 74 criteria to
4 main criteria and 10 sub-criteria as shown in Table 3.
These variables are considered essential from TIDE and
other data bases.
Step two: revised data set. After selecting our decision cri-
teria, we revised the data set to reflect only the data for
those criteria we were assessing. The data set used for the
remainder of our research is located in Table 4.
Step three: constructing the decision hierarchy. After identify-
ing our major decision criteria and their subordinate sub-
criteria, we constructed our decision hierarchy based on
our goal of ranking the terrorist alternatives in the Green
and Blue Target Lists (Figure 3).
Step four (steps two through four): pairwise comparison, deci-
sion weights, and consistency. In applying AHP’s pairwise
comparison process, we first constructed a pairwise matrix
containing our major decision criteria: individual
Table 1. Green Target List terrorist alternatives.
Green Target List
Terrorist ID 12 91 53 39 87 93 64 65 100 7 2 75 1 98 71 21 79 58 92 47 56
Analyst Rank 1 3 4 5 6 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 25 26 29 31 32
Ordinal Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21




54 3 52 50 24 22 73 77 6 78 63 103 19 72 104 70 45 13 25 27 33 4 83 90 99 66 67 23 60 86 84 40 96 97 20 74 107 15 30 80 69 16 17 5 10
Analyst
rank
1 2 3 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 22 23 25 26 36 36 37 38 39 39 40 41 43 45 46 47 47 48 49 50 51 52 57 61 62 63 65 67
Ordinal
rank
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
Table 3. Major decision criteria and subordinate sub-criteria.
Individual variables Organizational variables Worldliness variables SNA variables
1. Role in Organization 5. Organizational Type 6.Number of Critical Locations 8. Lead Eigenvector
2. References in Intel 7.Number of Countries Traveled 9. Closeness
3. Time as a Terrorist 10. Degree of Centrality
4. Number of Aliases
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variables, organizational variables, worldliness variables,
and SNA variables. We then systematically compared each
criterion with each other. Using Saaty’s nine-point scale,
these comparisons were scored on how we perceived their
relative importance was in our goal of ranking terrorists.
The results of this process are located in Table 5.
From Table 5, we see a preferred order emerge. Our
major decision criteria preferences can be interpreted as:
individual variables are more important than worldliness
and SNA variables; organizational variables are more
important than SNA variables.
Next, we applied Saaty’s21–23 three-step eigenvector
procedure to our pairwise matrix to determine our major
criteria vector weights (or local decision weights). Before
accepting our results, we calculated the consistency of our
preferences using Saaty’s consistency ratio (CR) formula.
Our major decision criteria local weights and overall cor-
responding consistency are shown in Table 6.
Since the consistency ratio (CR) was calculated to be
0.024 (less than the maximum 0.10) our preferences are
deemed consistent and resulting weights valid.
Assessment of decision sub-criteria
The processes used to calculate the local decision weights
and matrix consistency for our decision hierarchy’s sub-
criteria were similar to those used to calculate the major
decision criteria. The only exception being that during the
pairwise comparison step, our pairwise preferences for
each sub-criterion were scored based on our assessment of
their importance in influencing their parent major decision
criterion and the goal of ranking terrorists. Table 7 sum-
marizes the results.
Since our model uses the TOPSIS method to rank order
terrorists in lieu of entirely AHP’s method, the calculation
of global decision weights for our sub-criteria completes
our use of the AHP method.
Phase two: applying TOPSIS
After calculating the global decision weights of our deci-
sion criteria using the AHP method, we used TOPSIS to
rank our terrorist targets.
Step 1: create a decision matrix consisting of criteria and
alternatives. Our TOPSIS decision matrix was constructed
using our refined data for the Blue Target Lists found in
Table 1. The column to the left of the matrix consists of
the Blue Target List’s generic terrorist identity numbers
while the rows contain the data for our decision criteria.
The decision matrix constructed for the Blue Target List is
shown in Table 8.
We applied the TOPSIS steps and obtained output
shown in Table 9.
Figure 2. Twedell and Edmonds4 proposed terrorist attributes.
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Table 4. Revised data set based on decision criteria selection (note that cells with asterisks contained missing data values in
Twedell and Edmonds’ data set).























12 1G 4 288 58 34 4 5 9 8.642 3.245 40
91 3G 4 150 77 12 4 4 5 * * *
53 4G 2 244 47 2 4 4 8 0.679 4.282 4
39 5G 3 24 1 0 * * * 0.613 4.226 3
87 6G 3 2 18 33 3 1 1 2.474 3.841 6
93 12G 3 6 5 6 3 1 1 * * *
64 13G 3 3 5 12 3 1 1 2.344 3.81 6
65 14G 3 28 2 2 3 * * * * *
100 15G 2 34 1 2 3 2 2 * * *
7 17G 4 3 36 21 1 2 2 6.240 3.755 13
2 18G 4 24 6 17 3 2 2 * * *
75 19G 2 0 6 5 3 1 2 * * 8
1 21G 3 21 5 2 3 1 1 0.840 4.240 3
98 22G 4 36 25 17 3 1 2 * * *
71 23G 3 3 1 3 * * * * * *
21 24G 3 23 28 11 3 1 1 0.6122 4.33 7
79 25G 4 29 4 9 3 1 1 * * *
58 26G 3 21 16 13 4 1 4 9.339 3.457 17
92 29G 3 0 8 23 3 1 1 * * *
47 31G 0 10 1 2 3 1 1 * * *
56 32G 3 18 39 52 3 1 3 3.153 3.79 9
Blue Target List
64 1B 4 288 58 34 4 5 9 8.642 3.345 40
3 2B 4 150 77 12 4 4 5 2.312 3.794 12
62 3B 4 244 47 2 4 4 8 0.678 4.282 4
60 6B 1 7 5 9 3 1 1 14.773 3.190 47
24 7B 4 324 64 17 4 5 9 * * *
22 8B 0 0 1 0 3 1 1 * * *
73 9B 1 17 6 5 3 2 2 * * *
77 10B 4 36 12 8 4 3 6 * * *
6 11B 4 9 39 13 3 3 3 3.654 3.718 21
78 12B 3 11 15 15 3 2 3 * * *
63 13B 4 23 24 22 3 2 2 * * *
103 14B 3 31 21 12 3 2 3 0.00025 6.889 3
19 15B 3 18 39 52 3 1 3 6.795 3.689 24
72 16B 2 6 4 10 3 1 1 * * *
104 18B * 30 2 0 * * * * * *
70 19B 3 3 1 3 * * * * * *
45 20B 4 1 1 1 3 1 1 * * *
13 22B 3 23 6 2 3 1 1 * * *
25 23B 4 21 46 3 2 1 1 5.474 3.696 24
27 25B 3 32 19 1 2 1 1 4.051 3.774 16
33 26B 3 24 29 2 4 1 1 11.242 3.476 49
4 36B 0 27 3 0 2 1 1 * * *
83 36B 3 19 2 12 1 1 1 * * *
90 37B 3 0 31 15 3 2 5 * * *
99 38B 4 156 25 17 3 1 2 * * *
66 39B 3 36 2 33 3 * * * * *
67 39B 3 28 5 2 3 * * * * *
23 40B 3 28 6 0 3 1 1 11.132 3.242 38
60 41B 4 24 6 17 3 2 2 * * *
86 43B 3 2 18 33 3 1 1 2.474 3.841 6
84 45B 1 0 2 2 3 1 1 * * *
40 46B 3 10 44 0 3 1 3 22.34 3.09 86
(continued)
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Analyzing the results. When evaluating the performance of
any model it is first important to confirm that it functions
as it is designed to and then determine how well it func-
tions. The processes of model verification and model vali-
dation can provide this insight according to Thacker et
al.35 These processes are critical in evaluating any model
since ‘‘quantifying the confidence and predictive accuracy
of model calculations provides the decision-maker with
the information necessary for making high-consequence
decisions’’.
Table 4. (continued)























96 47B 3 12 0 5 3 1 2 * * *
97 47B 3 12 0 5 3 1 2 18.57 3.15 43
20 48B 3 23 28 11 3 1 1 0.6122 4.330 7
74 49B 3 4 8 21 3 1 1 * * *
107 50B 4 22 8 3 3 * * * * *
15 51B 4 39 4 0 2 0 1 0.594 4.317 4
30 52B 2 27 1 1 4 1 1 7.662 3.614 24
80 57B 1 6 3 1 3 * * * * *
69 61B 4 24 4 3 3 1 1 * * *
16 62B 3 31 1 3 1 * * 6.823 3.613 25
17 63B 4 14 15 6 3 1 1 0.569 4.456 4
6 65B 3 22 14 3 3 1 2 17.465 3.235 62
10 67B 2 33 7 1 3 1 2 * * *
Figure 3. AHP hierarchy model of the terrorist ranking decision problem.
Table 5. Pairwise comparison matrix of the major criteria with respect to the goal.
Major criteria Individual variables Organizational variables Worldliness variables SNA variables
Individual variables 1 1 2 2
Organizational variables 1 1 1 2
Worldliness variables ½ 1 1 1
SNA variables ½ ½ 1 1
Table 6. Major criteria local decision weight and consistency.





Consistency Ratio (CR) = 0.024
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Table 7. Global decision (vector) weights.
Major criteria Local weights Sub-criteria Local weights Global decision weights (criteria
weight × sub-criteria weight)
Individual Variables 0.3333 Role in Organization 0.3542 0.1181
Ref. in Intel Reports 0.2917 0.0972
Time as Terrorist 0.2083 0.0694
Aliases 0.1458 0.0486
Organizational Variables 0.2917 Organizational Type 1.0000 0.2917
Worldliness Variables 0.2083 Critical Locations 0.7500 0.1563
# Countries Trav. 0.2500 0.0521
SNA Variables 0.1667 Lead Eigenvector 0.5453 0.0909
Closeness 0.2866 0.0478
Degree Centrality 0.1681 0.0280
Note that the SUM of all weights = 1
Table 8. TOPSIS Blue Target List decision matrix.
Blue Target List Decision Matrix Decision Criteria




54 4 288 58 34 4 5 9 8.64203 3.34582 40
3 4 150 77 12 4 4 5 2.31276 3.79475 12
52 4 244 47 2 4 4 8 0.67809 4.28259 4
50 1 7 5 9 3 1 1 14.7738 3.19066 47
24 4 324 64 17 4 5 9 0 0 0
22 0 0 1 0 3 1 1 0 0 0
73 1 17 6 5 3 2 2 0 0 0
77 4 36 12 8 4 3 6 0 0 0
6 4 9 39 13 3 3 3 3.65351 3.71839 21
78 3 11 15 15 3 2 3 0 0 0
63 4 23 24 22 3 2 2 0 0 0
103 3 31 21 12 3 2 3 0.00025931 6.88911 3
19 3 18 39 52 3 1 3 6.79449 3.68969 24
72 2 6 4 10 3 1 1 0 0 0
104 0 30 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
70 3 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
45 4 23 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 0
13 3 21 5 2 3 1 1 0 0 0
25 4 32 46 3 2 1 1 5.47498 3.6965 24
27 3 24 19 1 2 1 1 4.05132 3.77432 16
33 3 27 29 2 4 1 1 11.2429 3.47665 49
4 0 19 3 0 2 1 1 0 0 0
83 3 0 2 12 1 1 1 0 0 0
90 3 156 31 15 3 2 5 0 0 0
99 4 36 25 17 3 1 2 0 0 0
66 3 28 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 0
67 3 28 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 0
23 3 6 5 6 3 1 1 11.1327 3.24222 38
60 4 24 6 17 3 2 2 0 0 0
86 3 2 18 33 3 1 1 2.47438 3.84193 6
84 1 0 2 2 3 1 1 0 0 0
40 3 10 44 0 3 1 3 22.3498 3.09484 86
96 3 12 0 5 3 1 2 0 0 0
97 3 12 0 5 3 1 2 18.5791 3.15029 43
20 3 23 28 11 3 1 1 0.612255 4.33025 7
74 3 4 8 21 3 1 1 0 0 0
107 4 22 9 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
15 4 39 4 0 2 0 1 0.593595 4.31712 4
30 2 27 1 1 4 1 1 7.66192 3.6143 24
80 1 5 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0
69 4 24 4 3 3 1 1 0 0 0
16 3 31 1 3 1 0 0 6.82329 3.61381 25
17 4 14 15 6 3 1 1 0.569282 4.45671 4
5 3 22 14 3 3 1 2 17.4653 3.23589 62
10 2 33 7 1 3 1 2 0 0 0
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Model comparison. We perform a model comparison by
comparing head-to-head model predictions to real-world
data. We first conducted a side-by-side comparison of the
original Blue Target List with the rankings generated by
our model as shown in Table 10.
In a direct comparison of our model rankings to the
subjective analyst’s rankings on the Blue Target list, our
model matched the ranks of the top two and the 9th terror-
ist. When comparing an aggregated top 5, top 10, or top
20 list without ordinal preference, our model successfully
matched 4 of the top 5, 5 of the top 10, and 9 of the top 20
terrorists, respectively. We assess that our model per-
formed exceptionally well and would expect significantly
better accuracy when constructed with the analysts and
decision makers responsible for ranking terrorist targets.
Phase three: conduct sensitivity analysis
The goal of our methodology is to create both an accurate
and useful model. While the process of verification and
Table 9. Distances and model derived terrorist rank.














































Table 10. Blue Target List comparison of analyst vs. model
results.
BLUE TARGET LIST COMPARISON
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validation in the previous phase demonstrated that our
model performs as intended, in this phase we conducted a
rigorous sensitivity analysis to gauge its robustness. Unlike
the validation process that compared our models results
with the analyst’s results, in sensitivity analysis, we are
only concerned with how changes in inputs affect the out-
puts of our model.
Impact of data outliers. The first form of sensitivity analy-
sis we conducted was to assess the impact of data outliers
on our model. In this test, we eliminated terrorist alterna-
tives from our model’s consideration that were missing
data for at least one of our four major decision criteria
(individual variables, organization variables, worldliness
variables, and SNA variables). Based on these constraints,
a review of our revised data set in Table 11 eliminated 27
terrorist alternatives. After removing these outlier terrorist
alternatives, we ordinally ranked the remaining 17 terror-
ists on the Blue Target List and reapplied TOPSIS. Our
new results were then juxtaposed next to our model’s orig-
inal results in Table 12.
By analyzing Table 13, we observed that there were no
significant terrorist ranking changes as a result of remov-
ing data outliers; thus demonstrating that our model is gen-
erally robust with respect to data fluctuations. With respect
to ranking terrorists, this knowledge is valuable to a deci-
sion maker. Since terrorist data sets, by their nature, are
generally incomplete, a decision maker gains confidence
in the model by knowing that its performance is not signif-
icantly degraded by these data gaps. While not presented
here, additional sensitivity testing should be performed on
criterion data inputs to better understand their relationship
in affecting a terrorist’s ranking. These tests are simply
performed by individually manipulating data or using a
simulation program to generate values to observe their
effects on the model’s results. Such sensitivity testing is
especially important in evaluating those data values that
are derived subjectively or measured qualitatively. Results
of this additional testing can be used to help refine data
collection methods and will ultimately improve the mod-
el’s robustness and the decision makers corresponding
confidence.
Identification of the most critical decision criterion. The next
focus of our sensitivity analysis consisted of identifying
the most critical decision criterion (the criterion that the
smallest change in weight has the largest impact to our
model). To accomplish this, we systematically applied the
step weighting process explained and demonstrated in our
methodology chapter to each of our 10 decision criterions
using step weights of ± 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.20, and 0.25. It
also is important to note that when adjusting a decision
criterion’s weight up or down, the decision weights of the
other criteria must be adjusted proportionally. To calculate
this proportional adjustment for the other decision weights,




1 wp  wj ; j 6¼ p, j= 1, 2, :::, k ð1Þ
Table 11. Comparison of target list rankings after removing data outliers.
BLUE TARGET LIST (outliers removed)
Terrorist ID Blue Target
List rank
Recalculated
rank after outliers removed
Model rank (based on




54 1 1 1 1
3 2 2 2 2
52 3 3 5 3
40 32 13 4 4
33 21 10 6 5
19 13 7 7 6
6 9 5 9 7
5 44 19 8 8
25 19 8 10 9
Top 10 30 39 17 14 10
97 34 14 12 11
20 35 15 17 12
50 4 4 13 13
86 30 12 20 14
23 28 11 16 15
103 12 6 21 16
17 43 18 22 17
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where wp+p is the new weight of the criterion being
assessed and w0j are the corresponding new decision
weights for the other criterion.30
The results of this analysis identified our Degree of
Centrality criterion as our model’s most critical criterion
(coincidentally, the Degree of Centrality criterion is also
considered our ‘‘least important’’ based on its global deci-
sion weight of 0.028). Figure 4 graphically depicts the
effects of increasing the decision weight of the Degree of
Centrality criterion on our model’s ranking results.
In Figure 4, each line represents a terrorist and their
corresponding rank as the decision weight value of the
Degree of Centrality criterion is increased (with the high-
est line on the vertical (y) axis being the top ranked terror-
ist at any specific weight value). The horizontal (x) axis
lists the amount of each incremental weight change that
we increased the Degree of Centrality criterion (with zero
(0) representing our model’s initial ranking results). By
analyzing Figure 4, we extrapolated that our model begins
to experience significant rank changes as soon as the
Table 12. Effects on terrorist rank when increasing the decision weight of the Degree of Centrality criterion.
Increase in decision weight
Terrorist Ranking 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
1 4 4 4 4 4
2 1 8 8 8 8
3 8 6 6 6 6
4 6 1 13 13 13
5 13 13 1 12 12
6 12 12 12 1 1
7 2 16 16 16 16
8 16 7 7 7 7
9 3 10 10 10 41
10 7 2 14 14 10
11 5 14 41 41 14
12 10 9 9 9 9
13 9 41 2 2 33
14 14 3 3 33 2
15 11 5 33 3 3
16 41 33 5 5 5
17 15 17 17 17 17
18 17 11 20 20 20
19 20 20 15 15 22
20 19 15 11 11 15
21 18 19 22 22 11
22 33 18 19 21 21
23 21 21 18 19 19
24 22 22 21 18 18
25 24 24 24 24 40
26 23 23 23 23 24
27 25 26 26 26 23
28 26 25 25 25 26
29 27 27 27 27 25
30 28 28 28 28 27
31 29 29 29 40 28
32 30 30 30 29 29
33 31 31 31 30 30
34 34 34 34 31 31
35 32 32 32 34 34
36 35 35 35 32 32
37 36 36 36 35 35
38 37 37 40 36 36
39 38 38 37 37 37
40 39 39 38 38 38
41 40 40 39 39 39
42 42 42 42 42 42
43 43 43 43 43 43
44 44 44 44 44 44
45 45 45 45 45 45
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Table 13. Model robustness to changes in decision criterion weights (criteria 1–3).
C1 (-) C1 (+ ) C2 (-) C3 (-) C3 (+ )
0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
# Match Top 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
% MATCH 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
# Matching Model Top 5 (11%) 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5
% MATCH 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 80% 100% 80% 80% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100%
# Matching Model Top 10 (22%) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 10 9 9 9
% MATCH 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 90% 90% 90% 100% 90% 90% 90%
# Matching Model Top 15 (33%) 15 14 14 13 13 14 14 15 15 14 14 14 12 11 11
% MATCH 100% 93% 93% 87% 87% 93% 93% 100% 100% 93% 93% 93% 80% 73% 73%
# Matching Model Top 23 (51%) 23 23 22 22 20 23 23 22 22 22 22 23 23 23 22
% MATCH 100% 100% 96% 96% 87% 100% 100% 96% 96% 96% 96% 100% 100% 100% 96%
Figure 4. Graph depicting the effects on the Blue Target List when increasing the decision weight of the Degree of Centrality
criterion.
Figure 5. Chart depicting the effects on Blue Target List when increasing the decision weight of the Degree of Centrality criterion.
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decision weight of our Degree of Centrality criterion is
increased. When the decision weight was increased as lit-
tle as 0.0025, our model’s initial top ranked terrorist
moves into second place. In Figure 4 rank changes are
depicted by the intersections of the colored lines (the line
with the positive slope at the intersection point increases
in rank while the line with a negative slope decreases). By
plotting these results as a bar chart, we gained a better per-
spective on the systemic effects of increasing the Degree
of Centrality decision weight (Figure 5).
Figure 5 shows that, although our model experienced
numerous terrorist rank changes when increasing the
Degree of Centrality criterion, the majority of these
changes are limited to only the top 16 terrorists. When
cross-referencing these results with our refined data set, it
became clear that these rank changes directly correlated
with whether or not a terrorist had data values for the
Degree of Centrality criterion. As we increased Degree of
Centrality’s decision weight, our model immediately
began to show prejudice towards the 20 terrorists who
were missing data. Table 14 provides a better depiction of
these rank changes by color coding our model’s initial top
16 and showing their change in rank at each decision
weight increase.
The results of this analysis are significant since it high-
lights that the Degree of Centrality criterion is extremely
sensitive to decision weight changes. This result should
make the decision maker re-evaluate using this criterion in
the model. If the decision maker deems that it is necessary
to keep this criterion, then pairwise comparisons should be
scrutinized to ensure that they accurately reflect the decision
maker’s preferences. Ultimately, if it is decided to keep both
this criterion and preferences it should highlight the impor-
tance of ensuring that the method and means of collecting
and recording the data for this criterion are as accurate as
possible. In this regard, identifying sensitive criterion addi-
tionally assists a decision maker in determining which intel-
ligence requirements are most important; known in military
terms as prioritized intelligence requirements (PIRs). While
this example highlighted only the analysis for the ‘‘most’’
critical criterion, this process should be used to evaluate all
of the criteria. For our model, in addition to the Degree of
Centrality criterion; both the Lead Eigenvector and
Countries Travelled criteria additionally demonstrated high
sensitivity and should also be scrutinized.
By comparison and to demonstrate that the ‘‘most
important’’ (or highest weighted) decision criterion is not
necessarily (and according to some literature rarely) the
most critical criterion, the results of decreasing the deci-
sion weight of the Organizational Type criterion (our mod-
el’s ‘‘most important’’ criterion) is presented in Figure 6.
Note that besides a few changes in terrorist ranking
amongst the terrorists at the bottom of the target list, the
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Evaluating the robustness of the model. Measuring the
robustness of a model, or its ability to effectively perform
while its variables or assumptions are altered is one of the
primary purposes of sensitivity analysis. Although primar-
ily based on the objective observations during sensitivity
analysis testing, the measure of a model’s robustness is
often a subjective or qualitative assessment. To assess the
robustness of our model fully, we need to define its pur-
pose fully. Although we stated that the goal of our model
was to rank terrorists with respect to their priority for tar-
geting, we did not clearly define what exactly we wanted
to observe. For instance, our model’s purpose could be to
strictly identify only the top terrorist for targeting, or it
could be used more broadly to develop top 5, top 10, or
top 20 target lists. Tables 13–15 were created by aggregat-
ing data from all of our most critical criterion testing and
are used to show our model’s robustness with respect to
decision weight changes at accomplishing the tasks of
identifying the top terrorist, top 5 terrorists (11% of the
Blue Target List), top 10 terrorists (22% of the Blue
Target List), top 15 terrorists (33% of the Blue Target
List), and top 23 terrorists (51% of the Blue Target List).
To define a level of robustness for our model, we aggre-
gated the results (how many target matches) for each of
our table’s matching objective rows. We then averaged our
results across each row. This row average represents our
model’s percentage of matching a specific ranking objec-
tive (top 1, 5, 10, 15, 23) irrespective of how any of the
Figure 6. Graph depicting the effects on Blue Target List when decreasing the decision weight of the Organizational Type criterion.
Table 15. Model robustness to changes in decision criterion weights (criteria 8–10).
C8 (-) C8 (+ ) C9 (+ ) C10 (+ )
0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.5 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
# Match Top 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
% MATCH 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
# Matching Model Top 5 (11%) 5 5 4 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 1 1
% MATCH 100% 100% 80% 40% 40% 40% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 40% 40% 40% 20% 20%
# Matching Model Top 10 (22%) 9 9 8 8 7 6 10 10 10 10 9 7 7 6 6 6
% MATCH 90% 90% 80% 80% 70% 60% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 70% 70% 60% 60% 60%
# Matching Model Top 15 (33%) 13 12 14 14 14 13 15 14 14 13 13 14 13 12 12 12
% MATCH 87% 80% 93% 93% 93% 87% 100% 93% 93% 87% 87% 93% 87% 80% 80% 80%
# Matching Model Top 23 (51%) 23 23 23 22 21 21 23 23 22 22 22 21 21 21 21 21
% MATCH 100% 100% 100% 96% 91% 91% 100% 100% 96% 96% 96% 91% 91% 91% 91% 91%
Table 16. Measure of robustness with respect to changing
decision weights.
Match Percentage of the time
Top terrorist 83%
Top 5 terrorists 83%
Top 10 terrorists 87%
Top 15 terrorists 86%
Top 23 terrorists 95%
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criterion weights are changed. These results are presented
in Table 16.
From these results (remembering that top 5 = top 11%,
top 10 = 22%, top 15 = 33%, and top 23 = 51%), our
model is robust when determining the top 10, 15, and 23
terrorists irrespective of ordinal rank. Again, as stated
above, these results take into account any potential deci-
sion weight changes for all of our criteria. In reality, the
potential for this wide range of decision weight changes
would be rare, even if trying to aggregate group decision
weights. In this respect, a decision maker can look at simi-
lar charts to better define their model’s robustness based
on their specific (or groups) range of decision weight
change for each criterion. If changes do not occur within
their weight thresholds, the model’s robustness can be
increased and vice versa.
4. Discussion
This process provides leadership at all levels with a meth-
odology to produce key target lists among terrorist and ter-
rorist organizations based upon quantitative analysis. The
research reflects the work of the authors and not the DOD,
the Department of the Navy, or the Naval Postgraduate
School.
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